Although the attack found all implementations of the JVM in browsers vulnerable, it is exploitable only in Netscape Navigator's fourth-generation software, according to the researchers.
The leader of the Princeton team and other experts said an Internet programmer could employ a "type confusion" attack on an unsuspecting user by deploying an attack applet to disable Navigator 4.x's security manager and then override the definition of system types, the fundamental pre-chosen descriptions of how object-based software runs.
This would allow a hostile party to do "whatever it likes on the victim's machine," read a report (see Resources) from the Secure Internet Programming (SIP) team at Princeton, which has already tested its own demo of the bug.
"The applet gets the JVM confused about which type a particular object is supposed to have," said Professor Edward Felten, the team's leader. "This lets the applet perform illegal type-casting operations, thus breaking the type system." He added that this process is enabled by a subtle flaw in Java's dynamic linking mechanism.
"The rest of the exploit uses techniques we don't discuss publicly in detail, since we think they're too useful to bad guys," he commented. Asked whether he could release a sample of the attack applet, Felten replied he could do so only to those who would promise not to publish it.
Other Internet security experts confirmed the viability of the new hole, which takes advantage of a multi-phase attack strategy.
The work at Princeton builds upon research by Dr. Mark LaDue, a security specialist at GTE based in Irving, TX. Earlier this year, LaDue created a set of hostile applets that can hamper security in the major browsers. One of these can create Java class loaders, providing a staging area in which the new Princeton attack can take place.
"The secondary flaw is surely the ability of applets to create AppletClassLoaders," said LaDue, who is also the independent producer of the Hostile Applets home page (see Resources). "The new applet surely loads its choice of classes in some unexpected fashion and thereby fools Netscape's JVM."
Another leading security analyst confirmed the seriousness of the new multi-phase breach. "The LaDue bug is definitely no big deal, but coupled with the problem found at Princeton it is a very big deal, indeed," said Dr. Gary McGraw, a research scientist at Reliable Software Technologies, in Sterling, VA. "The [Princeton] attack applet ... can do anything at all on a target machine: install a virus, delete files, et cetera. This is classic type confusion."
McGraw, co-author with Felten of the forthcoming Securing Java: Getting Down to Business with Mobile Code (John Wiley & Sons), added that the hole is "as critical as any ever discovered in Java."